By: Fauzan Luthsa – Geopolitical Analyst
LENTERAMERAH – On October 4, 2025—just a day before Indonesia commemorated the 80th anniversary of its National Armed Forces—Georgia was rocked by a political crisis. The small Black Sea nation nearly descended into chaos as thousands of demonstrators surrounded the Presidential Palace in downtown Tbilisi.
Opposition groups dissatisfied with the 2024 election results attempted to challenge the ruling Georgian Dream Party, which has governed since 2012. Despite being in power for over a decade, the party remains popular among voters and recently secured more than 80 percent of the vote in local elections.
What unfolded in Tbilisi serves as a reminder that political stability in one country never stands alone—it resonates across regions, from Tbilisi to Jakarta. Georgia, home to just 3.67 million people—roughly the population of Indonesia’s Yogyakarta Province—covers an area of about 69,700 square kilometers, comparable to Central Java but with a far smaller population density.
The political turbulence in Georgia cannot be separated from external influences—particularly the tug-of-war between those seeking balance and those leaning toward the European Union.
The Georgian Dream Party, winner of the 2024 elections, has long pursued a moderate path: maintaining economic ties with the West while preserving strategic security relations with Russia. Much like Serbia’s foreign policy doctrine of “sitting between two chairs,” Tbilisi has tried to sustain equilibrium.
Yet that middle ground has made it a target—from a frustrated domestic opposition and from foreign actors eager to turn Georgia into a Western foothold in the South Caucasus.
What began as political discontent soon spilled onto the streets. Former President Salome Zurabishvili stood among the protesters, emboldened by moral support from European officials who viewed regime change as inevitable. Speaker of Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, in a post on X, insisted that the storming of the Presidential Palace on October 4 was not a mere demonstration but an attempted coup.
He accused radical pro-Western groups of orchestrating the unrest to topple Georgia’s legitimate government. Papuashvili also pointed to former President Zurabishvili as a central figure behind the event—someone, he said, who had lost domestic legitimacy but clung to relevance through foreign backing.
According to him, the incident was the product of radical conspiracy and foreign intrigue—another attempt to ignite a “color revolution” in Georgia. He argued that foreign political support often serves as a tool of destabilization rather than democratization.
Ironically, despite no longer holding office, Salome Zurabishvili has continued meeting European groups while carrying state symbols, openly presenting herself as the country’s “legitimate president.” A gesture that many in Tbilisi see as infuriating—after all, she’s a former president still claiming the throne.
Papuashvili reiterated that the assault on the palace was not a spontaneous protest but a premeditated attempt to shake the foundations of Georgia’s government. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze later stated that Georgia had faced five attempted revolutions in the past four years—the latest being the storming of the presidential residence.
From that point, Georgia’s internal unrest evolved into a new chapter of geopolitical contestation in the South Caucasus. Given its location on vital energy and defense routes, any disturbance in Tbilisi reverberates through the regional balance. This is no longer a domestic issue—it reflects a broader shift in Eurasia’s strategic axis.
Reconfiguring Power in the Caucasus
For most people in Indonesia or Southeast Asia, Georgia may seem distant and unfamiliar—unlike Russia or Belarus. Yet the failed “creeping coup” of October 4 carries a butterfly effect for the wider region.
Known for its vineyards and ancient winemaking, Georgia sits at the crossroads of the Black Sea, Russia, and the Middle East—a position that has made it a perennial prize in the struggle for influence. A successful color revolution there would effectively extend NATO’s reach from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
That outcome would also reshape the regional geopolitical balance and place new pressure on Armenia—now warming to the West after years of disappointment with Moscow—to sever its remaining ties with Russia.
For Moscow, such a move would be seen as strategic betrayal, likely to provoke military or economic pressure, perhaps through heightened activity at Russia’s 102nd base in Gyumri or manipulation of energy supplies. Azerbaijan, too, would feel the ripple effects.
As a near neighbor, Russia seeks to maintain pragmatic relations with Tbilisi and has no interest in losing a friendly state, particularly amid Europe’s increasingly adversarial posture (with the exceptions of Hungary and Slovakia). Once again, Georgia’s political crisis has become part of the larger struggle for influence across the South Caucasus—a region pivotal to the emerging regional stability of Eurasia.
Eurasia’s Determination to Avoid Another Ukraine
Georgia’s struggle to maintain balance amid regional rivalries risks spawning a new instability. The country has long served as a geopolitical pivot—navigating between two major powers. For the Eurasian states currently consolidating their sphere, that balance remains vital.
What happens in Georgia could open a new front for Russia, as the war in Ukraine drags into a static, protracted phase. NATO countries supporting Kyiv have a vested interest in pulling Georgia into their orbit—creating a low-cost political and psychological pressure point, rather than a military one.
The intent is to distract Moscow, forcing it to open a “southern front of influence” while its military remains tied down in Ukraine. Should pro-European forces prevail in Georgia, the Kremlin would likely reinforce its presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this context, most Eurasian governments share one conviction: another “Ukraine” must be avoided.
Beyond politics, regional instability would drive up risk premiums along Eurasia’s trade and energy corridors—routes essential to accessing Asia’s growing markets and moving away from Europe’s turbulent ones.
The Butterfly Effect in Eastern Europe and the Balkans
Color revolutions remain potent instruments for political disruption—often backed by transnational networks advocating liberal democracy. Such movements have successfully triggered regime changes in several countries, often through waves of unrest and manufactured crises.
If the creeping coup in Georgia were to succeed, it would embolden pro-EU opposition movements in Moldova, Serbia and Belarus. Serbia, under President Aleksandar Vučić, has already faced multiple attempts at color revolutions fueled by public discontent.
Likewise, Belarus has experienced efforts to unseat President Lukashenko following disputed elections—a lingering echo of the “Maidan experiment.” These movements would also pressure Europe’s balancing states—Hungary and Slovakia—which have taken more moderate stances on the Ukraine conflict.
For NATO and the EU, this could reaffirm the thesis that political transformation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans remains achievable.
A Political Turning Point
The events in Georgia are likely to influence both Moscow and Minsk. With Belarus serving as the northern pivot of Eurasia’s security architecture, deeper defense integration between the two countries under the Union State framework now seems inevitable.
That integration is already underway. Tactical nuclear weapons have reportedly been deployed on Belarusian soil, along with Russia’s Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles and MiG-31K aircraft equipped with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. These developments increase strategic pressure on Poland, the Baltic states and NATO’s eastern flank.
Amid this volatile landscape, the Georgian crisis cannot be viewed in isolation. It may, in fact, strengthen a shared understanding of the need for regional stability.
The attempted color revolution in Georgia has, indirectly, amplified the significance of the Third Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security, scheduled for October 28–29, 2025. The forum is expected to serve as a platform for Eurasian nations to reaffirm their roles in an evolving global stability framework.
The conference will test new directions in regional geopolitics—examining global rebalancing, collective security and the role of technology and artificial intelligence in shaping 21st-century defense strategies.
Participants are also set to draft the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI Century—an initiative rooted in the principles of sovereignty, equality and equilibrium among states.
The charter stands as a political response to instability driven by external interference—and as a declaration of Eurasia’s intent to build a more autonomous and inclusive security architecture. ***
