By Fauzan Luthsa, Eurasian Geopolitics Analyst in Jakarta | Chairman of the Indonesia–Belarus Friendship Association
LENTERAMERAH — On 25 September 2026, negotiations on the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century are scheduled to be launched in New York on the sidelines of the high-level week of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. After nearly three years of discussions through international forums, bilateral consultations, and academic circles, the idea introduced by Belarus in 2023 is now entering the stage of interstate negotiations.
Belarus and Russia are promoting the Charter as a framework for relations among states in Eurasia, with sovereignty, equality, diversity, and indivisible security as its core principles. Its scope extends beyond security to encompass economic and humanitarian cooperation, technology and inter-civilizational relations.
An increasingly multipolar world means that more centers of power have to interact within a single international system. The issue, therefore, is not only how power is distributed, but also how relations among those centers are governed.
This is where the Charter is positioned. The idea seeks to move multipolarity beyond the question of power distribution toward a discussion of principles, rules, and mechanisms that could serve as the basis for interstate relations in Eurasia.
Following the launch in New York, the first round of negotiations is planned to take place through the end of 2026 and continue into 2027, with the text targeted for completion before being submitted to a meeting of Eurasian leaders in Minsk.
For countries outside Eurasia, this development deserves attention. Changes in the balance of power and the security architecture of Eurasia will also affect the broader strategic environment, including the Indo-Pacific.
For this reason, I have sought to examine how the idea is understood across different countries in Eurasia through a series of interviews that were previously published separately in this publication and are now brought together in a single article.
The diversity of these perspectives shows how the discussion surrounding the Charter is moving from its basic principles toward more concrete questions of how a new order will be built and negotiated.
From Belarus, the discussion of the Charter comes through the perspective of Vladislav Zasukhin, analyst to the Assistant Director at the Center for the Study and Development of Continental Integration “Northern Eurasia,” Republic of Belarus, on the idea itself and the changes in the global order that he sees taking place.
He views the Eurasian Charter of Multipolarity and Diversity as a systemic response to the structural crisis of the existing world order and the transition from unipolarity toward multipolarity. In his view, the Charter is not merely a framework for regional cooperation, but an attempt to formulate principles for a new model of international relations based on sovereign equality, non-intervention, economic cooperation, civilizational diversity, and indivisible security. Eurasia is at the center of this vision because its civilizational, political, and economic diversity provides a basis for developing alternative pathways in international relations.
At the same time, Vladislav does not see the Charter as an attempt to replace existing international institutions. On the contrary, the United Nations and existing multilateral mechanisms remain important, provided that they operate on the basis of equality and impartiality. From this perspective, the Charter constitutes a strategic framework for a period of transition, responding to the fragmentation and instability arising from the weakening of the unipolar order while laying the foundations for a more balanced and inclusive multipolar architecture.
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A more operational perspective comes from Shoaib Khan, Visiting Faculty at the Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai, and Founder and President of ALFAAZ Education and Cultural Society. He sees the Eurasian Charter not merely as a political statement, but as an action plan and strategy for Eurasia. For him, the next challenge is how the idea can be translated into an inclusive consultative mechanism that is not dominated by any single power.
In my view, a genuinely inclusive Eurasian consultative mechanism should function as a decentralized network of networks and should not be dominated by any particular power. Such a mechanism should connect existing sub-regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and ASEAN.
Through such a system, all major powers in the region could discuss issues such as security, economic cooperation, and transportation without being forced to take sides in larger global conflicts.
The mechanism should also explicitly uphold the fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including respect for the borders of every state, equality among states, and the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs.
All decisions should be made through the consensus of all member states, rather than being controlled by a single dominant power. The policies produced should be clear, predictable, and consistent with established international agreements, including the rules applicable within the World Trade Organization (WTO).
To be regarded as fair and gain international recognition, the mechanism must also embrace the principle of equal and indivisible security. This principle means that the security of one state should not be achieved at the expense of the security of another.
Such an approach is important to prevent the mechanism from being perceived as a military alliance directed against the West or as an exclusive group closed to other parties.
The Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity for the 21st Century is scheduled to be introduced in September 2026 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, coinciding with the high-level week of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly.
The Charter aims to build a security system led by the states of the region themselves, without external involvement from the West, based on the idea that “Eurasian solutions should be used to address Eurasian problems.”
The Charter would not provide room for any single state to use force unilaterally without dialogue and consultation. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of collective discussion to prevent conflicts and reduce tensions across the region.
Eurasia needs a new direction based on a principle that was already articulated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act but has never been consistently implemented: the principle of indivisibility of security. No state in Eurasia should seek to secure its own interests at the expense of another state. No external power should divide one Eurasian nation from another. Nor should regional conflicts be exploited as a means of gaining geopolitical advantage. The Charter is not intended merely as a broad political statement.
Instead, it is designed as a concrete action plan and strategy for the Eurasian supercontinent covering security, the economy, technology, culture, and various other sectors. To achieve these objectives, the Eurasian Charter envisions the establishment of several new institutions that would not duplicate existing Eurasian institutions.
These institutions could include a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eurasia, a small secretariat based in a neutral location, a dispute-settlement mechanism, and regular confidence-building activities involving dialogue and discussions in the military field. All these ideas, in my view, should be discussed, formulated, and agreed upon collectively by all parties involved.
The next question is how the idea is viewed from Central Asia, a region situated between several centers of Eurasian power and one with direct experience of changes in the geopolitical balance. Below is the perspective of Esen Usubaliev, Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Oriental Studies at Kyrgyz National University, on the Charter and the possibility of developing a more inclusive Eurasian security architecture.
If a new security architecture in Eurasia is built on the fundamental principle of equal and indivisible security, then ultimately the system would encompass all geopolitical actors in Eurasia, including the European Union.
In this context, the Eurasian Charter of Diversity has considerable potential to serve as the conceptual foundation for the emergence of a New Helsinki Process in the 21st century.
The most important inclusive mechanism within this framework is not formal membership in particular organizations or structures. What matters far more is a fundamental shared recognition among all parties that peaceful coexistence and the joint development of rules for a polycentric world constitute the only realistic option.
Only through a shared recognition of the importance of finding a path toward peaceful coexistence can this idea become genuinely viable and sustainable. Unfortunately, however, not all parties in Europe understand this yet.
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China is one of the major actors in the geopolitical transformation of Eurasia and the global order today. China’s position is important because the discussion of multipolarity also concerns how states with different levels of power and different interests can participate in shaping common rules.
In a separate interview, Edmund Sheng, Distinguished Professor at Shandong University, whose research covers international political economy, Eurasian governance, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), discussed the Charter and how the idea of multipolarity can be translated into a more concrete framework.
For a Eurasian Consultative Mechanism to attain genuine legitimacy, it must prioritize inclusivity and tangibility. It should avoid replicating the hierarchical structures of 20th-century alliances by ensuring that middle and small powers possess genuine veto power over issues directly affecting their sovereignty. Furthermore, its mandate must extend beyond high politics to address quotidian challenges such as customs harmonization, pandemic response, and climate migration. Legitimacy will accrue not from declaratory statements in New York, but from demonstrable improvements in the daily governance of cross-border interactions.
For Russia, the Eurasian Charter does not stand alone, but is connected to changes in the Eurasian security architecture and relations among the region’s major powers. In an interview, Andrey Gorokhov, Editor-in-Chief of Russian Political Science, explained the steps that have been prepared to bring the Charter into the interstate negotiation process.
Indeed, the official launch of negotiations on the development of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity is scheduled at the UN for September 2026 in New York. This was recently stated by the Ambassador of Belarus to Russia, Yuri Seliverstov. The consultative mechanism has already been clearly presented and publicly outlined:
First, until September 2026, Belarus and Russia will be actively working — through briefings — to form a group of Eurasian states that will participate in the negotiation process. Second, this group of states will officially launch the charter process in September 2026 in New York. Thirdly, the first round of negotiations will take place by the end of 2026. Fourthly, subsequent rounds will be held in the capitals of other interested states.
Fifthly, Belarus, as the initiator of the charter idea, has declared its readiness to chair the negotiation process. At the same time, Belarus has indicated the possibility of co-chairing with another state that wishes to share this function with us. Sixthly, Belarus and Russia are working on the initial text — the zero draft of the charter. This document will be sent to the partners after the process is launched in September.
The negotiation process is planned to be completed by autumn 2027, and the charter text will be submitted for consideration at the Eurasian leaders’ summit, which is scheduled to be held in Minsk in October–November 2027. If all the planned actions are implemented, the document may gain broad legitimacy and international support.
These perspectives bring the discussion of the Eurasian Charter into focus from several different angles. After looking at how the idea is being discussed from within Eurasia, I want to return to the question that has also drawn my attention from the beginning: how can this development be viewed from Jakarta?
Although Indonesia adheres to the doctrine of an bebas-aktif foreign policy, under President Prabowo Subianto Indonesia is considered to have developed close relations with Russia and BRICS. Relations with Belarus have also developed rapidly since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1993, while Indonesia has simultaneously sought to balance its relations with the United States.
For Indonesia, developments surrounding the Eurasian Charter cannot be viewed as an issue taking place only in the far north. Changes in Eurasian security have a direct connection to Indonesia’s interests, particularly in the area of food security. Indonesia therefore has strong reasons to pay attention to the process at the UN General Assembly.
There is a more fundamental point of convergence concerning the idea of multipolarity and the rejection of domination, which is closely associated with Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy doctrine throughout more than seven decades. This principle emerged from the need to preserve room for maneuver amid great-power competition, and the increasingly multiplex nature of the international system makes that question relevant once again.
In this context, the Eurasian Charter is worth watching because it seeks to bring these principles into a regional security framework. This experience can provide a point of reflection for discussions on the security architecture of Southeast Asia. The idea does not stop at acknowledging that the world is moving toward multipolarity, but also seeks to consider how the order emerging from that transformation can be built and governed.
Ultimately, the issue is not simply whether the world is moving toward multipolarity. What matters more is the form of the order that emerges from that transformation. Multipolarity should not end in fragmentation. Instead, it should create greater space for more balanced relations among states and allow each country room to safeguard its own interests.
The Eurasian Charter brings this discussion into a broader context, namely how the international order will function when the world no longer has a single center of power. ***
